Emotions, Poverty, or Politics: Misconceptions About Islamic Movements; Strategic Insights, v. 3, issue 1 January  2004) by Baylouny, Anne Marie
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Faculty and Researcher Publications Faculty and Researcher Publications
2004-01-04
Emotions, Poverty, or Politics:
Misconceptions About Islamic
Movements; Strategic Insights, v. 3,
issue 1 January  2004)
Baylouny, Anne Marie
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
Strategic Insights, V. 3, issue 1 (January  2004)
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/11103
Emotions, Poverty, or Politics: Misconceptions About Islamic 
Movements 
Strategic Insights, Volume III, Issue 1 (January 2004) 
by Anne Marie Baylouny 
Strategic Insights is a monthly electronic journal produced by the Center for Contemporary Conflict at the 
Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. The views expressed here are those of the author(s) 
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Violent movements in the name of Islam have been catapulted to center stage in U.S. foreign policy 
concerns. However, before concrete strategies can be formulated to deal with this concern, the nature 
and dynamics of Islamist mobilization itself must be understood.[1] What motivates an individual to join an 
Islamist group and possibly use violence? Under what conditions will these groups moderate, and when 
will they radicalize? While our policy choices dealing with the Muslim world and international terrorism 
inevitably hinge on our answers to these questions, a serious application of theory has been lacking.[2]  
Lessons culled from the study of contentious or claim-making politics provides valuable insight into 
unraveling the complicated politics of the region and further contributes to the formulation of policy 
prescriptions to diffuse the movement's violent manifestations. Social movement theory in particular 
demonstrates that local political inclusion can stimulate moderation, stemming the progression of militant 
Islamism in its infancy. 
Theoretical Explanations and Inadequacies 
Characterizations of Islamism have typically been based upon emotions, economic desperation or cultural 
anger. In this line of reasoning, poverty, rejection of western culture, or lack of hope for the future spur 
involvement in groups that aim, through the creation of an Islamic state or isolation from the global 
community, to return to a past state of glory. Some link Islamism with poverty and deprivation. Others, 
including Islamists themselves, reiterate Samuel Huntington's call that the West is culturally opposed to 
the rest of the world. Under these theories policies to decrease Islamism's appeal would thus center on 
economic growth or cultural separation: increase living standards or relax integration into the international 
economy. Appealing as those objectives may be to many, the data on Islamism and oppositional 
movements in general indicate that the equation of economic or cultural distress with Islamism is 
misplaced, or at the very least, incomplete. 
Islamism in these psychological and economic-based explanations is the outcome of an explosion of 
pent-up grievances,[3] "the straw that broke the camel's back", or a person "fed up" and gone crazy.[4] 
While it makes intuitive sense, this theory does not fit the reality. Varying economic circumstances across 
regions and time periods do not correspond with the occurrence of rebellions and protest movements, as 
many scholars have shown.[5] In fact, economic grievances abound through history, yet movements 
based on them have been rare. When is a grievance bad enough to start a movement? And why do 
starving populations often not rebel, while their well-off neighbors do? Iran's Islamic revolution occurred in 
a context of economic plenty, and an analysis of Muslim countries demonstrates the lack of fit between 
this theory and the actual history of Islamist actions.[6]  
The social background of individual members further demonstrates the fallacy of such ideas. Islamist 
activists are neither economically deprived nor culturally traditional. They are neither loners nor marginal 
individuals searching for meaning and belonging, persons unable to get along in modern society. Instead, 
Islamists come from the most technically advanced sectors of society, often students or graduates of 
engineering and the technical sciences. Islamist activists are well-rooted in their communities and have 
extensive personal networks, parallel to nationalistic terrorists in other regions of the world.[7] The 
September 11th terrorists, and suicide bombers in the Palestinian territories, are a testament to this 
profile.[8] A survey of Hizballah adherents found that despite its rhetoric, the party was not in fact the 
representative of the lower class, but rather that the bulk of support came from the middle and upper 
classes.[9] 
Focusing on religion or religiosity to identify Islamists is similarly misguided. Religiosity and political Islam 
are not directly correlated; Islamists and their supporters are not more religious than non-Islamists. 
Similarly, support for Islamist movements diverges sharply from popular acceptance of their goals—most 
prominently, establishment of an Islamic state. In Lebanon, the overwhelming majority of Hizballah 
adherents along with Shi'a in general prefer a Western political system (modeled on Switzerland or the 
United States), not a theocratic one. Discrepancies exist between the percentage of voters for Hizballah 
and those who chose it as their favored political party, with lower approval ratings for the latter—indicating 
strategic voting and not widespread belief in the movement itself. Hizballah members are not significantly 
more religious than the adherents of secular political parties. In fact, a significant amount of the highly 
religious declared themselves adverse to the establishment of Islamic political parties.[10] Surveys in the 
West Bank and Gaza strip found similar opinions. Overall, less than three percent of Palestinians in the 
territories desired an Islamic state, while almost 21 percent trusted Hamas more than any other political 
faction.[11]  
In fact, culture and economics are only indirectly related to Islamist mobilizing for violent and moderate 
groups alike.[12] Grievances alone do not create a movement. At most they are but one element that 
organizers can exploit to aid in organizing. Directly contradicting economic deprivation explanations, 
resources and networks are necessary for movements to organize.[13] Leaders generally come from 
relatively privileged social groups. Thus, the substance of the movement and its ability to mobilize 
members are more important than the broad statements about motivations picked up by the Western 
press. What does it take to attract a following and organize a network of followers? 
Social Movement Theory and Islamist Responses to Democratic Carrots 
Theories of contentious or adversarial politics, of which social movement theory is the most prominent 
branch, are well placed to address these issues.[14] Social movement theory has long tackled the 
question of terrorism and violent conflict. Through the lens of social movement theory, the conundrum of 
Islamism, so difficult for other perspectives to solve, becomes clear. Beyond the demonstrations and 
letter-writing campaigns common to democratic systems, contentious politics span a continuum from riots 
to revolutions and terrorism.[15] Non-violent movements more typically recognized as social movements 
are included, but these are rare in authoritarian systems. 
Despite the claims of movement adherents, the real motivating grievances of Islamism are local issues. 
Like other social movements, including the anti-globalization campaign, the concerns that motivate 
Islamists center on their town, their state, and their local economy. Islamist movements differ considerably 
from each other, having been molded by the states they oppose, the resources available to them, their 
networks, and other specifically local factors. Even within states, movements can have radically opposed 
motivating agendas. Some even compete and attempt to defeat other Islamist movements.[16] 
Statements by group leaders and Islamist charters should thus be viewed in light of their actions in 
response to concrete changes. Publicly, Hamas may well adhere to its goal of eradicating Israel, yet 
when has it moderated its behavior in practice? What conditions will bring about a truce, or alternatively a 
willingness to establish a legitimate political party and participate in democratic elections?[17] As Tilly 
stated, the "rhetoric of rebellion" does not equate to the actual grievance. Viewing the entirety of 
movement practices, not their statements, reveals an alternative logic.[18]  
Acknowledging Islamism as oppositional politics indicates that its trajectory is not random, but governed 
by political considerations and strategic calculations. It can develop into different forms of protest and 
organizing, including civil society and social welfare associations, given appropriate and credible 
incentives. The relevant influences for the movement are the array of political opportunities it faces. The 
key questions for policy makers are what are the prevailing power relations, how does the group want 
these relations to change, and what paths to inclusion in the political system are open or blocked? The 
latter includes splits among elites that movements can exploit, opportunities to partake in electoral politics, 
and the character of repression by the state. 
Exclusion or inclusion from the political system plays a powerful role in radicalizing movements. While 
fears of "one person, one vote, one time" will remain, the data indicate that when given the opportunity to 
participate in politics at the price of moderation, movements will alter their very nature to respond to this 
stimulus. Hizballah's experience demonstrates this dynamic. Not only has the group moderated to enter 
electoral politics, but also it reframed its central objective, foregoing its objective of an Islamic state. 
Lebanon's Christian population makes this a special case, to which Hizballah must be sensitive to avoid 
renewed conflict.[19] The party formed alliances with Christians and supported Christian candidates in 
elections. The incentives the movement responded to demonstrate the fundamental logic of the 
movement, rhetoric to the contrary notwithstanding. 
Democratic theory has long held that participation in the formal political arena moderates political parties. 
Movements are co-opted, choosing to work within the limits of the system. They hope for change through 
the political process, rather than the risky option of violent conflict. Further, once leaders or political 
parties have obtained a vested interest in the system, they will exert pressure upon the more radical 
wings to not jeopardize their established position. On the other hand, when the opposition party is illegal, 
no incentive to moderate exists. 
To mobilize continuous support, organizations must provide public demonstrations of the movement, a 
sort of advertising or communication with the constituency. Newsletters may be good for Greenpeace, but 
an illegal movement must establish alternative public means to advertise its existence.[20] CNN is perfect 
for international movements; local news suffices for domestic movements. Violence is one tactic to glue 
the movement together, create an identity and group solidarity. Absent viable participation in the political 
realm, violence also serves the movement function of communicating demands to authorities.[21] When 
groups are legal, public performances such as demonstrations can perform this vital role. Legalization 
provides an alternative, legitimate means to secure organizational survival. 
Further, movements do not merely build upon pre-existing identities or reflect group feelings already in 
place. Instead, social movements actively fashion new identities, mainly through the technique of framing. 
Framing is the formulation of ideological schemes akin to slogans which sell the movement to a 
constituency. Frames must resonate with the population, by tapping into existing symbols, while at the 
same time transforming their cultural meanings. Problems are spun as unjust grievances for which clear 
blame can be assessed and a solution proposed by the movement. Accepted symbols are used in novel 
ways, much the way liberation theology altered Christianity. Poverty, once accepted as an act of God, 
became a social issue of fundamental injustice. 
Religion plays a key role in Islamist movements, but not due to doctrinal specifics or the religiosity of 
Islamists. The religion in practice has been shown to be malleable, adopting aspects of nationalism and 
leftist or Leninist mobilization often deemed antithetical to the religious doctrine itself.[22] Religious 
movements have distinct advantages in authoritarian contexts. Islam provides a frame for solidarity, 
particularly when other organizing is forbidden. Not only can religious movements monopolize the 
organizing field, due to harsh restrictions on mobilizing, but religion also provides symbols of justice 
extending beyond the individual's rational cost-benefit calculus.[23] In non-democratic environments, 
symbolic protest—the veil, kaffiyeh, colors of the flag, or vague slogans such as "Islam is the solution"—
dominates political communication. The requisite resources and networks of mobilizing, integral to social 
movement success, are also found in religion's institutional legacy and its charitable works. In most of the 
Middle East, Islamist movements were promoted by the state in previous decades as a counter to the 
left,[24] the fruit of which the region is now reaping. Currently, Islamist charities substitute for the state's 
bankrupt social welfare institutions. 
The democratic process itself may well be central to removing the impetus for violent tactics in Islamist 
movements; however, this democracy must internally be considered fair, authentic, and legitimate. The 
Arab world is rife with countries whose elections epitomize a democratic façade, while substantive 
violations pervade the process. Far more countries use the rhetoric of Islamism to deny civil liberties and 
basic human rights, fueling precisely the dynamic which drives targeted organizations to use violent 
tactics in their fight with the opposition. Any policy of encouraging democracy must be uniform, neither 
barring participants from the democratic process nor canceling elections Algerian-style.  
Conclusion 
Islamism is one of the most important foci of policy makers and scholars today, yet misconceptions about 
it abound. We lose a great deal by ignoring the knowledge generated through years of study in other 
parts of the world, data that could aid in correctly identifying what Islamism is, what causes it, when it 
turns violent, and how best to meet our policy aims. Movement pragmatism provides an opportunity to 
craft targeted policies. Disregarding the practice of Islamist movements to respond to democratic 
incentives is tantamount to the tunnel vision that led to surprise at the fall of the Soviet Union or the 
revolution in Iran.  
Some individuals and groups may be beyond the pale, unrecoverable to democratic politics. But even 
these originally grew out of local politics, and could have been defused there. The "Arab Afghanis," or 
Arabs who fought in the Afghan war, first earned their stripes in radicalization on the local front. 
Repressed and unable to operate in their own countries, they emigrated, eventually joining international 
groups that lacked a local social base. This process can be halted at the local level, by identifying the 
operative political grievances, and opening the political realm to contestation. For Islamist leaders to 
become political players, they must expand their constituency and be accountable to it. Given the 
disjuncture between the populace's goals and those of Islamist elites, moderation would most likely result.  
For more insights into contemporary international security issues, see our Strategic Insights home 
page. 
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